The recent arrest of Linda Sun on charges of espionage in New York has raised serious concerns regarding the preparedness of governmental bodies to detect and manage the risk of infiltration by malicious third parties.
Sun, a naturalised US citizen, was charged with espionage, money laundering, visa fraud and alien smuggling after allegedly gathering sensitive information for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the course of several years, whilst employed by the New York State government.
The case has drawn attention to the sophisticated methods employed by foreign intelligence services and the vulnerabilities within institutions that can be exploited for espionage purposes, particularly in this case dealing with the political issues that Sun would often interact with in the course of her day-to-day work. Sun’s access allowed her to undertake a range of activities on behalf of the CCP, such as directly blocking Taiwanese officials from having access to meetings with their counterparts in New York.
The case serves as a reminder of the need for vigilance among organisations to be aware of the signs of espionage or internal fraud, which in this instance materialised by the Sun’s living far beyond the means of regular governmental employees – often enjoying lavish trips and concerts amongst other incentives.
Practically, for businesses, this may mean reporting and safeguarding employees, taking a more active role in vetting and scrutinising those with high-level access and implementing a system of continual monitoring to guard against such intrusion.
Although eventually detected, this matter is a reminder that espionage need not only target the upper echelons of corporate structures or policy making bodies, but can also act at a more local level, to impact policy and working to influence agendas with a much smaller impact. After all, the directive of every operative can’t be to effect change on a national level, it often takes a network operating in a coordinated manner to effect change over time.